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Introduction & Objective 
The determinants of indebtedness of Indian firms in the post-liberalization period has been 
researched in Kakani (1999), Bhaduri (2002, 2002a), Guha-Khasnobis and Bhaduri (2002), 
Mahakud and Bhole (2003), Bhole and Mahakud (2004), Mahakud (2006), Mishra (2011), 
Majumdar (2012) and Mukherjee and Mahakud (2012). Findings of these studies suggest that the 
agency as well as the asymmetric information theories of capital structure are valid in the Indian 
context; the variables firm size, tangibility of assets, firm growth and profitability were observed 
to be consistently significant and in conformity with the theorized relation. In deriving these 
conclusions, however, the focal point was largely on listed and liquid manufacturing firms; the 
case of unlisted manufacturing firms still remains largely unexplored. The reason behind the 
same may be attributed to lack of continuous and credible data for these companies over a 
desirable period long enough to construct coherent models, or to a mindset that Zingales (2000) 
suggested often compelled the researcher to select large, liquid firms in ‘normative’ samples for 
testing existing capital structure theories.  
The economic significance of the unlisted manufacturing sector in India can hardly be 
undermined. While data on employment generating capacity of these firms is not available, 
revenue statistics available with the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy for the year 
ended 31st March 2010 for 2747 unlisted manufacturing firms suggests that their combined 
revenue accounts for 7.64% of the country’s GDP (at 2010 prices) for the same year, and is 
22.26% of the total revenue generated by all listed manufacturing firms in the country over the 
same period. Even when this sector plays a critical role in fostering economic growth, a 
considerable body of empirical evidence in Bradley and Saunders (1992), Bradley (1997), 
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Carpenter and Peterson (2002) and Beck and Kunt (2006) suggests that inadequacy of capital has 
been a constraining/growth inhibiting factor for these firms. However, our understanding of 
unlisted firm’s financing behavior in the Indian context remains shallow. We do not know what 
determines the borrowing behavior of these firms or whether there is a ‘pecking-order’ of 
borrowing among alternative sources. Does existing theories adequately explain indebtedness in 
this sector? Does a close bank-firm relationship allow unlisted firms to borrow extensively on a 
unsecured basis or is it that secured borrowing enables unlisted firms to overcome the problems 
of information opacity? Does monitoring that secured debt brings with itself influences firm 
performance and act as a substitute for the missing technical/managerial resources that may be 
beyond the reach of this sector? This paper attempts to address these issues and fill up this gap in 
existing literature on indebtedness in India.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section deals with a selective review of 
literature and empirical evidence on borrowing behavior of unlisted firms, followed by the 
methodology adopted and its rationale. Findings of the research and an analysis of the same is 
presented before discussing the important conclusions and limitations of this research.  
Review of Theoretical Literature and Empirical Evidence 
In a path-breaking paper Miller and Modigliani (1958) provided the formal proof of their now-
famous debt- irrelevance propositions. The crux of their argument was that, under perfect capital 
markets the value of the firm was determined solely by the company’s investment policy and its 
economic substance was independent of the composition of (debt and equity) the liability side of 
the firm’s balance sheet. Market imperfections are however a reality and hence the development 
of corporate financing theory post-1958 focus on capital structure relevance under market 
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imperfections. Of these alternative theories that emerged in the last 64 years, the agency and 
asymmetric information based explanations of capital structure appear more relevant in 
explaining the firm-level determinants of (informationally opaque) unlisted firms. The former 
(almost omnipresent in all forms of business organizations) highlights the conflict of interest 
among stakeholders in a company and the role of debt financing in resolving the same (Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), Jensen (1986) and Diamond (1989)), while the latter 
focuses on financing choice when stakeholders (including outside lenders) are not equally 
informed about the company/project prospects (Ross (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984) and 
Myers (1984)).  
Empirical validation of capital structure theories typically involve testing the (nature of) relation 
and statistical significance of certain firm level factors (the independent variables) used as 
surrogates of theoretical attributes on alternative measure of firm level indebtedness (the 
dependent variable). Following Rajan and Zingales (1995) observation, that asset tangibility, 
growth, firm size and profitability plays a pivotal role in determining indebtedness, this paper 
employs these four variables in the analysis. Inclusion of these four variables is further 
conditioned by the overwhelming evidence of their significance in determining indebtedness in 
the Indian context, as well as in the context of developing nations (see, Booth, et. al (2001)). 
Furthermore Michaelas et al. (1999), Cassar and Holmes (2003) and Hall et al. (2004) also 
provides evidence concerning the significance of these variables in determining indebtedness of 
small and medium enterprises. The following paragraphs discuss the role of these variables and 
their relation with theory.  
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Asset tangibility is among the most critical variables influencing indebtedness. Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) suggested that the existence of tangible assets serves two critical purposes; it 
enables the borrower to pledge them as collateral diminishing the agency costs of debt (like risk 
shifting), and at the same time protects the lender in the event of liquidation. Collateralized 
borrowing also resolves the problems of asymmetric information by providing credible signals to 
lenders regarding project quality as suggested in Myers (1977), Scott (1977), Harris and Raviv 
(1990). Consequently a larger proportion of tangible asset in a firm’s asset portfolio is expected 
to reduce supply side constraints. Collateralized borrowing is however not cost free, for it leads 
to a loss of flexibility for the pledging firm in so far as the assets use and liquidity is concerned 
(Stultz and Johnson, 1985), and may result in moral hazard problems with regard to the 
borrower’s use of the pledged asset (Igawa and Kantas, 1990). While there is overwhelming 
empirical evidence on a positive association between asset tangibility and indebtedness, there are 
a few contrary evidences, especially with regard to collateralized borrowing. Leeth and Scott 
(1989) observed a direct relation between the use of secured loan and the likelihood of default. 
Inderst and Muller (2007) noted that while observably risky borrowers faced higher collateral 
requirements. An even more startling finding of the study was that after controlling for 
observable borrowers risk, collateralized loans were more likely to default ex post.  
Financing growth is one eternal challenge that firms face. While growth opportunities or options 
add value to a firm, they have little or no collateral value primarily because of its intangible 
nature. From the investor point the challenge associated with financing growth options is that it 
is most difficult to dictate performance of the borrower ex ante and even more costlier to enforce 
compliance ex post. Consequently as Myers (1977) suggests, lenders perceive a high possibility 
of risk-shifting activities on the part of company managers and underinvestment, and hence are 
6 
 
reluctant to finance growth. However contrary to this inverse relationship between growth and 
indebtedness, the pecking order theory suggests that the inability of growth firms to meet their 
financing requirement from internal sources might force them to raise resources externally, 
preferably through debt. And, if long-term debt is not fourth coming, growing firms take 
recourse to short-term borrowing to meet their fund requirements.  
The variable firm size is another important firm level variable incorporated in almost all 
empirical models dealing with indebtedness owing to its capacity to serve as a proxy for multiple 
firm-level attributes.  Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggested that size can be taken as an inverse 
proxy of probability of financial distress, while Fama and French (2002) indicate to the use of 
this variable as a inverse proxy of cash flow volatility; larger the size of the firm higher the 
probability of it being diversified and hence less volatile its cash flows (as a consequence of 
diversification). Rajan and Zingales (1995) further states that ‘size may also be a proxy for 
information outside investors have’ (p. 1451) implying that larger sized firms may also benefit 
from lower information asymmetry problems between firm insiders and investors, hence 
favorably affecting the supply of both debt (the more preferred source of capital in the firm’s 
pecking order) as well as equity.  
The role of profitability in determining the extent of indebtedness is difficult to theorize. The 
pecking order theory of capital structure, due to Myers (1984), asserts that firms prefer internal 
finance to external sources of funds, and even in raising external finance, firms preferred debt, 
then hybrid securities such as convertible bonds, equity being the last resort.  In a nutshell, firms 
are aversive towards creating new/additional claim holders to its cash flows, and in situations 
when these claimants were created, firms would prefer to engage the least information intensive 
source of financing. Consequently internally generated funds (primarily profits) played a 
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significant role in determining external fund requirement, and in turn indebtedness. The theory of 
optimal capital structure however suggests that profitable firms should take recourse to debt 
financing in order to achieve greater tax savings associated with debt use. Moreover, increased 
use of debt financing (and hence the legally binding cash outflows every period) in these firms 
reduced the amount of free cash flow available to managers, and the associated problems as 
suggested in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986). However empirical evidence in 
India and elsewhere generally point to the validity of the pecking order hypothesis. 
While there is a considerable body of empirical work on the borrowing behavior of small and 
medium enterprises, evidence on the borrowing behavior of unlisted firms are far and few. In the 
context of Morocco, Achy (2009) observed an inverse relationship between tangibility and both 
total and short-term debt. Firm growth impacted short-term borrowing positively, and 
profitability had a positive effect on long-term borrowing and a negative impact on short-term 
borrowing. The study further observed that small firms tended to increase debt levels instead of 
opting for capital from outside investors while larger firms relied more on their retained earnings 
to meet their long-term fund requirement. Yartey (2011) observed that unlisted firms in Ghana 
financed most of their growth from external debt of short maturity. The study also observed that 
the dominant firm level factors affecting debt ratios of unlisted firms in Ghana were firm size, 
firm growth, tangibility of assets and profit margin; firm size, asset tangibility and growth were 
observed to be inversely related to debt-equity ratio, while profit margin positively impacted 
indebtedness. Evidence available from Jõeveer (2012), in the context of 9 European countries 
suggested that for unlisted firms, the firm level variables affecting indebtedness depended on the 
definition of leverage used. Specifically, if leverage incorporated only short-term debt (not all 
short-term liabilities), tangibility of firm’s assets and firm size inversely affected indebtedness, 
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while if leverage was defined to incorporate non-debt liabilities like trade credit (an important 
source of funds for more financially constrained firms) as well, tangibility and firm size 
positively affected indebtedness. The inverse relation between profitability and indebtedness 
remained valid irrespective of the definition of leverage used. In the Indian context, Green et. al 
(2003) is the only study to have incorporated unquoted manufacturing firms as a separate sample 
in studying indebtedness. Using a sample of 139 private unquoted manufacturing firms, the 
analysis revealed that unquoted companies had a persistently higher proportion of financing from 
shareholders' funds than quoted companies over the period 1989-99. This finding is in line with 
Rajan's (1992) reasoning that one reason companies went public was to improve the terms of 
their access to debt. 
Methodology  
The population for our empirical study include the universe of manufacturing firms in India. 
From this population we included only unlisted firms in our sample. The total number of such 
firms whose financial information is available in the database of Centre for Monitoring the 
Indian Economy (as on 22nd August, 2012) stood at 7902. The sample was further filtered to 
exclude group affiliated firms and firms belonging to the co-operative and joint sector, to include 
only unlisted private standalone firms, reducing the sample size further to 5314 firms. 
Availability of data on a continuous basis for unlisted firms appeared to be a major impediment 
in creating the final sample. The final filter imposed on this sample of firms was continuous data 
availability from the period 2005-2006 through to 2009-2010. Consequently the sample size 
stood at 864 resulting in 3456 firm-year observations. The financial data necessary for the 
empirical analysis is obtained from the database PROWESS of the Centre for Monitoring the 
Indian Economy.  
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This paper employs panel regression model as a statistical tool for analysis. Panel or longitudinal 
data refers to data containing time series and cross sectional observations of a number of 
individual units. For instance, debt ratio of a firm i in a sample of j firms represent the cross 
sectional dimension, while the same ratio over time for the same firm, denoted by t, represent the 
time series dimension. The key feature of panel data that distinguishes it from pooled cross-
section is that the same cross sectional units are followed over a certain period of time.. 
Balestra and Nerlove’s (1966) paper on pooling cross-section and time series data marked the 
beginning of this variety of data modeling and in applied studies and methodological 
development of this new econometric tool. A primary reason behind its increasing adoption in 
social science research stems from the model’s greater capacity of modeling complex behavior 
compared to single cross-sectional or time series data alone. In particular, panel data models 
provide major benefits for econometric estimation in controlling for individual heterogeneity, 
eliminating or reducing estimation bias and reducing the problems of data multi-collinearity. 
These advantages of panel data provide the basic motivation behind the choice of this regression 
model in our analysis. 
The panel data model we test here is specified as follows: 
yit=αi + βXit +εit 
where Y represent the alternative measures of borrowing, X, is the explanatory variables, εit is 
the error term, and i and t denote firm and time. The alternative measures of borrowing employed 
in the model are (i) total borrowing as a ratio of total assets (TB), (ii) long-term borrowing as a 
ratio of total asset (LTB), (iii) short-term borrowing as a ratio of total assets (STB) and (iv) 
secured borrowings as a ratio of total borrowing (SB). The terms long-term and short-term 
borrowing have their usual meaning in accordance with corporate finance theory. The 
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independent variable tangibility is measured by the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets of the 
firm, firm growth is measured by the growth of net assets, natural log of sales revenue is used as 
a proxy of size and profitability is measured by profit after tax as a percentage of net worth.  
To ascertain the significance of firm and time effects in the data set, and to find out a suitable 
panel data method for estimation purpose, the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test, Lagrange Multiplier 
(LM) test and Hausman specification tests are carried out for the sample of firms. For the 
estimation equation the overall F-Statistic and its statistical significance, along with R-squared 
value is used to judge its relevance and sufficiency. The statistical significance and the sign of 
coefficients associated with each of the independent variables are used to analyze the hypothesis 
made.  We also present the coefficients of the regression model using industry dummies to 
ascertain the influence of industry effects in explaining borrowing behavior. 
This research aims to test the following hypothesis: 
Table 1. The set of hypothesis and expected sign  
H1: total borrowing is positively related to tangibility of firm’s assets + 
H2: long-term borrowing is positively related to tangibility of firm’s assets + 
H3: secured borrowing is positively related to tangibility of firm’s assets + 
H4: total borrowing is inversely related to firm growth - 
H5: long-term borrowing is inversely related to firm growth - 
H6: short-term borrowing is positively related to firm growth + 
H7: secured borrowing is positively related to firm growth - 
H8: total borrowing is positively related to firm size + 
H9: long-term borrowing is positively related to firm size + 
H10: short-term borrowing is positively related to firm size + 
H11: secured borrowing is positively related to firm size + 
H12: total borrowing is inversely related to profitability of the firm - 
H13: long-term borrowing is inversely related to profitability of the firm - 
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Asset tangibility has been observed to enhance total and long-term debt capacity of firms of a 
firm. Since the definition of tangibility used in this research does not include inventory, 
receivables or other similar assets usually pledged as collateral against short-term borrowing, the 
exact relation between tangibility and short-term borrowing is difficult to hypothesize. The set of 
hypothesis concerning growth opportunities is largely in line with the challenges that borrowers 
face in pledging growth as collateral and the role of secured debt in resolving such challenges. In 
the context of firm size, the hypothesis is based on the argument of size being a reverse proxy for 
probability of bankruptcy, hence favorably affecting debt capacity. Such firms are also expected 
to reduce capital cost by borrowing on a secured basis and hence the hypothesized positive 
relation. With regard to profitability it is assumed that profitable firms would require less of 
external financing on a long-term basis as the pecking order theory suggests; it is however not 
know how short-term borrowing or secured borrowing is related to profitability. 
Findings and Analysis 
Table 2 provides a comparison of the final sample of 864 firms employed in the sample with a 
sample of all private stand alone manufacturing firms listed in the BSE small cap index (n=127). 
Total indebtedness in listed small cap firms is higher than the sample of unlisted firms used in 
this research for all the years under study, and the difference has been pronounced in the case of 
long-term borrowing ratio. Unlisted firms on the other hand, have a higher short-term borrowing 
ratio; the difference however seems to have narrowed in the last year under study. An interesting 
finding from table 1 is that the proportion of secured borrowing to total borrowing is higher for 
listed small cap firms compared to the sample of unlisted firms. 
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Table 2: Mean indebtedness of BSE small-cap sample (BSE(SC) and  
unlisted firms sample(UFS)  
 
Year 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 
Total borrowing to total assets 
BSE(SC) 0.4010 0.3784 0.3952 0.3954 
UFS 0.3643 0.3672 0.3638 0.3544 
Long-term borrowing to total assets 
BSE(SC) 0.2557 0.2195 0.2444 0.2193 
UFS 0.1858 0.1829 0.1812 0.1780 
Short-term borrowing to total assets 
BSE(SC) 0.1453 0.1589 0.1508 0.1761 
UFS 0.1785 0.1843 0.1826 0.1764 
Secured borrowing to total borrowing 
BSE(SC) 0.7414 0.7911 0.8424 0.8707 
UFS 0.7166 0.7293 0.7311 0.7305 
 
Table 3 provides a description of the sample in terms of their industry affiliation and their 
respective share in the total. Of the fourteen industry sectors to which the sample belongs to, 
firms belonging to manufacture of basic metals has the highest representation (12.96%) while 
manufacturers of non-metallic mineral products have the lowest representation (1.81%) in the 
present sample. The classification is based on the National Industries Classification (NIC) 2008 
codes prepared by the National Statistical Organization.  
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Table 3. Sectoral distribution of the sample  
(Based on National Industrial Classification (NIC)-India, 2008) 
Industry 
Number of 
firms in the 
sample % 
Manufacture of basic metals 136 12.96% 
Manufacture of beverages 33 3.15% 
Manufacture of chemical and chemical products 95 9.06% 
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 25 2.38% 
Manufacture of electrical equipment 36 3.43% 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 40 3.81% 
Manufacture of food products 125 11.92% 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 41 3.91% 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  19 1.81% 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 45 4.29% 
Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal, chemical and 
botanical products 62 5.91% 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 52 4.96% 
Manufacture of textile 112 10.68% 
Manufacture of transport equipments 43 4.10% 
Total (n) 864 100.00% 
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Table 4 disaggregates total borrowing of firms in the sample into different categories along with 
the percentage share of each of the components in the total. Borrowings from bank, in particular 
secured bank borrowing constitute the lion share of borrowed capital for firms in the sample 
across all the years under observation. Other major sources of borrowed capital are borrowings 
from financial institutions (other than banks), foreign currency borrowings, loans from 
promoters, directors and shareholders and inter-corporate loans (item no. 3, 4, 5 & 6). Together, 
these five sources of funds constitute more than 91% of borrowed capital for the firms under 
study. While no preferred hierarchy or pecking order of sources of financing are visible among 
these items in the Table 4, the number of firms with loans from promoters, directors and 
shareholders and with inter-corporate loans in their balance sheet far outweigh those with loans 
from other financial institutions and those with foreign currency borrowings, as observed in the 
Table 5. Table 4 also indicates that, of all the different categories of borrowing observed in the 
sample, the incidence of foreign currency borrowing is the least in all the years under 
observation.  
Several important observations emerges from these tables 4 & 5. Unlisted firms circumvent the 
problem of missing capital markets by extensively deploying bank borrowings in order to meet 
their financing requirements. The role of other financial institutions appears at best marginal. 
The observed incidence of secured borrowing (in terms of both volume and frequency) has three 
feasible interpretations; unlisted firms tide over the problems of information asymmetry 
(resulting in higher cost of obtaining credit) through secured borrowings from banks/financial 
institutions, or banks might be following certain regulatory requirements while advancing credit 
to this sector, or it is a reflection of risk averse behavior exhibited by these institutions while 
advancing credit to unlisted firms. Irrespective of the cause, collateral capacity appears to be an 
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Table 4: Major components of aggregate borrowing between 2006-07 to 2009-2010 and their respective share in total 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 
 
Rs. in 
mil. % 
Rs. in 
mil. % 
Rs. in 
mil. % 
Rs. in 
mil. % 
1. Total Borrowings 218462 
 
293572 
 
342965 
 
408012 
 of which: 
        2. Borrowing from banks 166276 76.11% 219207 74.67% 266361 77.66% 312901 76.69% 
     2.(a)Secured bank borrowings 156173 71.49% 206503 70.34% 254630 74.24% 299674 73.45% 
     2.(b)Unsecured Bank borrowings 10103 4.62% 12704 4.33% 11731 3.42% 13227 3.24% 
3. Borrowing from financial institutions 8084 3.70% 10404 3.54% 8820 2.57% 8856 2.17% 
     3.(a)Secured financial institutional borrowings 7857 3.60% 10348 3.52% 8233 2.40% 8743 2.14% 
     3.(b)Unsecured borrowings from financial institutions 227 0.10% 56 0.02% 586 0.17% 114 0.03% 
4. Foreign currency borrowings 11055 5.06% 14406 4.91% 16236 4.73% 22248 5.45% 
     6.(a)Secured foreign currency borrowings 7416 3.39% 10133 3.45% 11481 3.35% 18204 4.46% 
     6.(b)Unsecured foreign currency borrowings     3638 1.67% 4273 1.46% 4755 1.39% 4044 0.99% 
5. Loans from promoters & directors  7139 3.27% 7076 2.41% 7729 2.25% 9806 2.40% 
     7.(a)Secured loans from promoters & directors 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
     7.(b)Unsecured loans from promoters & directors 7139 3.27% 7076 2.41% 7729 2.25% 9806 2.40% 
6. Inter-corporate loans 9699 4.44% 17649 6.01% 19472 5.68% 18038 4.42% 
     6.(a)Secured inter-corporate loans 2483 1.14% 2535 0.86% 4023 1.17% 3770 0.92% 
     6.(b)Unsecured inter-corporate loans 7216 3.30% 15114 5.15% 15449 4.50% 14267 3.50% 
7. Other borrowings 16210 7.42% 24830 8.46% 24348 7.10% 36163 8.86% 
 
*Other borrowings include borrowings from state and central government, interest accrued and due, hire purchase loans, debentures and bonds, deferred credit and all those 
borrowings that could not be classified under any of the categories mentioned in 1 through to 8, and are mentioned in company accounts as ‘other borrowings’. 
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Table 5. Incidence of major category of borrowings  
(Items 1 through to 6 of Table 2.) 
 
2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 
1. Total number of firms in the sample 864 864 864 864 
of which: 
    2. Number of firms that borrowed from 
banks 805 802 801 796 
     2.(a) On a secured terms 799 797 796 790 
     2.(b) On  unsecured terms 67 75 74 78 
3. Number of firms that borrowed from 
other financial institutions 112 106 104 94 
     3.(a) On secured terms 104 94 93 86 
     3.(b)On unsecured terms 10 13 11 9 
4. Number of firms with foreign currency 
borrowings 76 83 62 74 
     4.(a) On secured terms 61 69 50 61 
     4.(b) On unsecured terms 17 18 14 15 
5. Number of firms with loans from 
promoters & directors  359 349 348 342 
     5.(a) On secured terms 0 0 0 0 
     5.(b) On unsecured terms 359 349 348 342 
6. Number of firms with inter-corporate 
loans in their balance sheet 333 346 346 330 
     6.(a) On secured terms 93 111 105 98 
     6.(b) On unsecured terms 264 272 278 268 
 
important determinant in debt capacity of unlisted firms. To the extent these four years under study is 
capable of indicating the dynamics of this market, findings here suggest a gradual decline in the share of 
borrowings from other financial institutions in total borrowings.  
While the incidence of foreign currency is low, its share in total borrowing is higher than those of 
financial institutions (as high as 5.45% in 2010). Two observations from the sample are noteworthy. This 
component of borrowing appears positive for 54 firms over three years consecutive years out of the four 
years under consideration, and each of these firms necessarily have positive foreign exchange earnings in 
each of the years. Consequently it appears that access to this source of funding is either conditional on the 
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firm’s capacity earn foreign currency or arises in the natural course of business, for instance through 
suppliers line of credit.  
As expected, loans from directors and promoters for these unlisted firms are always on unsecured terms, 
for in case of these firms, they will be the owners/partners of the company of the company. An intriguing 
observation form table 5 is the high incidence of unsecured inter-corporate loans indicating the existence 
of an internal capital market even among standalone private business organizations.  
Table 6, representing the summary statistics of alternative measures of indebtedness as observed in our 
sample reveals that firms involved in manufacture of textiles has the highest value of total indebtedness 
(0.4549), followed by manufacturers of food products (0.4096) and manufacturers of basic metals 
(0.3771). Long-term indebtedness is highest in firms involved in manufacture of textiles (0.2816) 
followed by firms in manufacture of non-metallic mineral products (0.2133) and paper and paper products 
(0.2080), while short-term indebtedness is highest for firms involved in manufacture of basic metals 
(0.2288), followed by manufacturers of food products (0.2056) and manufacturer of fabricated metal 
product firms (0.1940). The observed values of mean and median long-term and short-term indebtedness, 
however does not indicate substantial difference with regard to their preference as a source of financing 
for unlisted firms included in the sample. Inter industry differences however do exist; for instance, textile 
manufacturing firms are more dependent on long-term sources of funds vis-à-vis short-term sources while 
the dependence is other way in case of manufacturers of basic metals.  
Data on secured borrowings as a fraction of total borrowings reiterates our earlier observations: mean and 
median secured borrowing ratio is 0.71 and 0.72 respectively indicating the preponderance of 
collateralized borrowing as the primary source of raising finance. Table 4 reveals that, secured borrowing 
ratio is highest in firms involved in manufacture of basic metals (0.7644), paper and paper products 
(0.7651) and transport equipments (0.7634).  
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Table 6. Summary Statistics of indebtedness by industry category 
Industry TB/TA LTB/TA STB/TA SB/TB 
Manufacture of basic metals 
Mean 0.3771 0.1483 0.2288 0.7644 
Stdev 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.27 
Manufacture of beverages 
Mean 0.3805 0.1906 0.1899 0.7014 
Stdev 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.35 
Manufacture of chemical and chemical products 
Mean 0.3451 0.1764 0.1687 0.6923 
Stdev 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.33 
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical 
products 
Mean 0.2528 0.1239 0.1289 0.7171 
Stdev 0.15 0.13 0.09 0.31 
Manufacture of electrical equipment 
Mean 0.2578 0.0993 0.1585 0.7316 
Stdev 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.36 
Manufacture of fabricated metal product, except 
machinery and equipment 
Mean 0.3394 0.1454 0.1940 0.7047 
Stdev 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.31 
Manufacturer of food products 
Mean 0.4096 0.2056 0.2040 0.7336 
Stdev 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.30 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 
Mean 0.2334 0.0747 0.1587 0.6491 
Stdev 0.16 0.09 0.13 0.38 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products  
Mean 0.3667 0.2133 0.1534 0.6507 
Stdev 0.26 0.26 0.15 0.41 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 
Mean 0.3756 0.2080 0.1676 0.7651 
Stdev 0.20 0.15 0.13 0.28 
Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal, 
chemical and botanical products 
Mean 0.3191 0.1713 0.1478 0.7141 
Stdev 0.20 0.18 0.11 0.31 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
Mean 0.3236 0.1645 0.1590 0.7347 
Stdev 0.19 0.17 0.12 0.30 
Manufacture of textile Mean 0.4549 0.2816 0.1733 0.7352 
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Stdev 0.20 0.18 0.13 0.30 
Manufacture of transport equipments 
Mean 0.3533 0.2017 0.1516 0.7634 
Stdev 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.26 
Mean  
 
0.3624 0.1820 0.1824 0.7269 
Median 
 
0.3650 0.1467 0.1660 0.8371 
Standard Deviation 
 
0.1942 0.1614 0.1382 0.3103 
 
Note: TBR denotes total borrowing ratio, LTBR refers to long-term borrowing ratio, STBR refers to short- term 
borrowing ratio, SBR refers to secured borrowing ratio.   
Table 7 shows correlations between the variables selected in the model. The correlation matrix 
reveals a few important findings with regard to our sample. Tangibility is positively correlated to 
both total and long-term borrowing and inversely correlated to short-term borrowing. All 
measures of indebtedness are positively correlated to firm growth; the correlation is insignificant 
in case of short-term borrowing. The variables firm size as well as profitability has expected 
correlations; it is insignificant between size and long-term borrowing, and between firm 
profitability and short-term borrowing.  
Table 7. Correlation matrix 
 
TBR LTBR STBR SBR Tang Growth Size Prof 
Tang 0.15** 0.34** -0.19** 0.01 1.00 -0.13** -0.17** -0.06** 
Growth 0.05** 0.04* 0.02 0.12** 
 
1.00 0.23** 0.11** 
Size 0.17** 0.01 0.23** 0.32** 
  
1.00 0.05* 
Prof -0.08** -0.07** -0.03 0.04* 
   
1.00 
Note: (a) **. Denote correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) and * denote correlation is significant 
at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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(c) TBR denotes total borrowing ratio, LTBR refers to long-term borrowing ratio, STBR refers to short- term 
borrowing ratio, SBR refers to secured borrowing ratio.   
 
Table 8 presents the result of regression for the alternative measured of indebtedness used in this 
research based on the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test, Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test and Hausman 
specification test results given in Appendix I. Based on the Hausman test results, the fixed 
effects model is employed in the model for total borrowing ratio, long-term borrowing and 
secured borrowing ratio, while the random effects model is employed for short-term borrowing 
ratio. Findings reveal that total borrowing is positively related to tangibility of assets and firm 
growth, while it is inversely related to firm profitability. The relationship between firm size and 
total borrowing is insignificant. Long-term borrowing is positively related to tangibility and firm 
growth, and inversely related to firm size; the relation between long –term borrowing and 
profitability is statistically insignificant.  Short-term borrowing is inversely related to tangibility 
and profitability, and positively related to firm size; the relation between firm growth and short-
term borrowing is statistically insignificant. Secured borrowing ratio is positively related to 
tangibility, firm size and growth opportunities; its relationship with firm profitability is 
statistically insignificant. Table 9 presents the findings of this research alongside the 
hypothesized nature of relationship.  
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Note: FEF and FEFT refers to Fixed Effect Firm and Fixed Effect Firm and Time, REF and REFT refers to Random Effects Firm and Random Effects Firm and 
Time. ** denote significance at the 0.01 level and * denote significance at 0.05 level. The fixed effect model does not have an intercept term. The figures in 
parenthesis alongside the coefficients show the standard errors.  
 
 
 
Table 8: Results of Regression 
Total borrowing ratio Long-term borrowing ratio Short-term borrowing ratio Secured borrowing ratio 
Variables Model 1(FEF) Model 2(FEFT) Model 1(FEF) Model 2(FEFT) Model 1(REF) Model 2(REFT) Model 1(FEF) Model 2(FEFT) 
Tangibility 0.11(0.024)** 0.11(0.024)** 0.194(0.021)** 0.193(0.021)** -0.098(0.014)** -0.087(0.02)** 0.116(0.036)** 0.117(0.036)** 
 
Firm Growth 0.02(0.006)** 0.015(0.006)* 0.024(0.005)** 0.023(0.0053)** -0.008(0.0047) -0.008(0.005) 0.019(0.008)* 0.022(0.009)* 
Size 0.001(0.004) 0.002(0.004) -0.009(0.0036)** -0.0086(0.004)** 0.014(0.002)** 0.011(0.0036)** 0.276(0.006)** 0.0243(0.006)** 
Profitability -0.06(0.002)** -0.059(0.002)** -0.0002(0.0015) -0.0002(0.0015) -0.006(0.0014)** -0.0057(0.0015)** 0.0009(0.0026) 0.0011(0.0026) 
Constant -------- 0.295(0.028)** --------- 0.14(0.025)** 0.141(0.014)** 0.155(0.02)** --------- 0.52(0.042)** 
No of Obs. 3456 3456 3456 3456 3456 3456 3456 3456 
Adjusted R2 0.8144 0.8148 0.7910 0.7904 0.7447 0.7453 0.8336 0.8337 
F-Test Result 
F(867,2588) = 
18.49** 
F(871, 2584) = 
18.45** 
F(867, 2588) = 
16.05** 
F(871, 2584) = 
15.96** 
F(867, 2588) = 
12.62** 
F(871, 2584) = 
12.61** 
F(867, 2588) = 
20.98 
F(871, 2584) = 
20.89 
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Findings of this research the role of asset tangibility in indebtedness is in the expected direction; 
it enhances both long-term and secured debt raising capacity of the firm. These tangible-asset 
rich firms, however, appear to be less dependent on short-term borrowing. One possible 
interpretation is that unlisted firms are deploying long-term funds to cover their working capital 
requirements, which though inefficient from the cost perspective, may be the best strategy in 
case these firms face refinancing risk of short-term loans.  
Table 9. Hypothesized relation and observed relation 
Hypothesis 
Predicted 
sign 
Observed 
sign 
H0:  total borrowing is positively related to tangibility of firm’s assets + + 
H0:  long-term borrowing is positively related to tangibility of firm’s assets + + 
H0:  secured borrowing is positively related to tangibility of firm’s assets + + 
H0:  total borrowing is inversely related to firm growth - + 
H0:  long-term borrowing is inversely related to firm growth - + 
H0:  short-term borrowing is positively related to firm growth + - 
H0:  secured borrowing is positively related to firm growth + + 
H0:  total borrowing is positively related to firm size + Insig. 
H0:  long-term borrowing is positively related to firm size + - 
H0:  short-term borrowing is positively related to firm size + + 
H0:  secured borrowing is positively related to firm size + + 
H0:  total borrowing is inversely related to profitability of the firm - - 
H0:  long-term borrowing is inversely related to profitability of the firm - Insig. 
23 
 
Evidence between firm growth and indebtedness does not stand in line with theory. Findings of 
this research indicate that long-term (secured) borrowing is positively related to firm growth; 
unlisted firms finance growth through secured long-term borrowing. This finding is not hard to 
interpret given the measure of growth employed in this research; for manufacturing firms, year-
on-year growth in net assets is expected to be strongly correlated to growth in fixed assets, and 
hence the observed positive relation. The statistically insignificant relation between firm growth 
and short-term borrowing provides further supporting evidence that long-term assets may be 
financed through long-term sources of funds. It appears that secured borrowing is able to resolve 
the problems of risk shifting and underinvestment that lenders to these firms may be prone to.  
The inverse (direct) relation between long-term (short-term) borrowing and size does not support 
the conclusions laid down by theory, even if the arguments may still remain valid. An inverse 
relation between size and long-term borrowing may be because larger sized unlisted firms are in 
fact diversified and more stable, but are faced with lower long-term external capital requirement, 
hence the inverse relation. However, in order to generate sales in large volume, these firms may 
be dependent on the supporting role of short-term (secured) financing that banks and financial 
institutions extend against the security of inventory/receivables.  
The statistically insignificant relation between profitability and long-term borrowing, and the 
inverse relation between short-term borrowing and profitability is again, contradictory to what 
the pecking order theory would suggest; our findings suggests that unlisted firms internal 
resource generating capacity only reduces its short-term fund/financing need, with no bearing on 
long-term fund requirement. Consequently, these firms might be entirely dependent on outside 
capital for financing its growth and expansion. The statistically insignificant relationship 
between profitability and secured borrowing also does not provide any evidence of the positive 
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role (of monitoring) that secured debt may have on company a company’s performance and 
hence profitability.  
Conclusion and Limitations 
 
This research examined the borrowing behavior of unlisted private stand-alone manufacturing firms in 
India over the period 2006-07 to 2009-10 using balance sheet data. Findings suggest that total 
indebtedness is lower in unlisted manufacturing firms compared to their listed counterparts, and the 
difference is more pronounced in long-term borrowing ratio compared to short-term borrowing ratio. 
Unlisted manufacturing firms depend predominantly on banks for financing purposes in order to 
circumvent their inability to tap financial resources from capital markets, and they borrow predominantly 
on a secured basis. It seems collateralized borrowings enables these firms to overcome the problem of 
information opacity; asset tangibility enhances debt capacity in general and secured debt capacity in 
particular as the agency theory would suggest. This research does not provide any evidence to suggest 
that a close bank-firm relationship ease collateral requirements for unlisted firms, nor is there any 
evidence of the monitoring role of secured debt enhancing firm performance and hence profits. The 
‘pecking order’ of financing as the asymmetric information theory of capital structure suggests, does not 
seem valid for unlisted firms; internal resource generating capacity only influences reliance on short-term 
funding, with no bearing on long term fund need.  
This research paper suffers from several limitations. Financial information used in analyzing borrowing 
behavior of unlisted firms are from secondary sources and hence would incorporate all errors that might 
have crept in while compiling such data in the data base. Unavailability of financial information for the 
required number of years has resulted in certain firms and sectors of the economy not being included in 
the sample, and has hence affected sample size and representation. Similar problems have limited the time 
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period of the study to only four years. The study does not include unlisted services sector firms in the 
sample, and hence its findings cannot be generalized in the context of unlisted firms in India. 
The availability of financial resources or funding opportunities to unlisted firms seems largely dependent 
on collateral capacity and is grossly inadequate in terms of alternatives. While there are a plethora of 
institutions targeted at development of specific sectors in the country, these ‘other financial institutions’ 
does not appear to have played any substantial role in easing these constraints for unlisted firms. 
Furthermore, the huge share of bank loans in total loan portfolio of this sector and the commensurate 
exposure of banks to unlisted firms may have played a determining role in extent of collateralization of 
such loans.  And in the absence of any evidence on linkage between collateralization and profitability, it 
seems unlikely that banks may have played any role in enhancing the productivity of this sector. 
Consequently, while risk has been minimized, growth in employment and output may have been 
compromised in the long-term. There appears to be a strong case for both the policy maker and financial 
economist to have a relook at the constraints that unlisted firms face and redefine the role of the banks 
and financial institutions from being a passive provider of capital to that of a partner in ushering growth.  
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Appendix I: Test Results 
Table 1: Likelihood Ratio (LR) Test, Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test and Hausman Test results 
for the sample. 
CLRM vs model with Group 
effects 
CLRM vs model with Group & time 
effects 
(a) Total borrowing ratio 
Tests  Test Statistics Test Statistics 
LR Test χ2(863) = 6563.41** χ2(867) = 6576.18** 
LM Test χ2(1) = 3274.99** χ2(2) = 3275.08 
Hausman 
Test χ2(4) = 31.11** χ2(4) = 27.12** 
(b) Long-term borrowing ratio 
LR Test χ2(863) = 5922.46** χ2(867) = 5923.11** 
LM Test χ2(1) = 2934.96** χ2(2) = 2936.56** 
Hausman 
Test χ2(4) = 36.38** χ2(4) = 35.07** 
(c)Short-term borrowing ratio 
LR Test χ2(863) = 5422.51** χ2(867) = 5435.46** 
LM Test χ2(1) = 2696.37** χ2(2) = 2696.38** 
Hausman 
Test χ2(4) = 5.79 χ2(4) = 3.61 
(d) Secured borrowing ratio 
LR Test χ2(863) = 6788.44** χ2(867) = 6794.30** 
LM Test χ2(1) = 3401.5** χ2(2) = 3402.99** 
Hausman 
Test χ2(4) = 17.71** χ2(4) = 18.10** 
 
